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Finality and Fairness in Grievance Arbitration: 
Whether Allegations of Unfair Representation 
Justify Termination of Arbitration 
The confluence of conventional notions of individual liberty 
and public policy in industrial relations is frequently turbulent. 
Perhaps the turbulence is most apparent when the interests of an 
individual employee flow counter to the interests of both manage- 
ment and organized labor. This circumstance may arise when the 
employee's union unfairly represents him in a grievance proceed- 
ing against management. In such a circumstance, the individual 
need for fair representation clashes with policies favoring exclu- 
sive union representation and adherence to grievance procedures 
outlined in the applicable collective bargaining agreement. This 
Comment will consider the clash as it has arisen at  the arbitration 
stage of grievance proceedings, specifically concentrating on the 
question whether arbitration of a grievance should go forward 
when the grievant complains that his union has breached its duty 
of fair representation and conspired with management to deprive 
him of his rights under the collective bargaining agreement. 
To set the stage for an analysis of this question, this Com- 
ment will consider the national labor policies involved in griev- 
ance arbitration, particularly focusing on the doctrine of arbitral 
finality and the "exhaustion of remedies" requirement. The na- 
ture of the duty of fair representation will be briefly considered, 
and case law relating to the question whether grievance arbitra- 
tion should go forward when a grievant contends he is not being 
fairly represented will also be reviewed. Finally, the issue will be 
analyzed from the standpoints of law and policy in an effort to 
distill a reasonable resolution of the problem. 
Over a period of several years, the evolution of national labor 
policy has produced two doctrines that have particular impact on 
the issue under consideration. One of these-the doctrine of arbi- 
tral finality-basically provides that arbitral awards are final and 
not subject to judicial view.l The other is the exhaustion of reme- 
1 .  See Comment, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Prob- 
lems of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 936, 948-50 (1976). 
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dies doctrine. It provides that a grievant must exhaust his reme- 
dies under the collective bargaining agreement before bringing 
his grievance to the courtr~om.~ Each of these doctrines, the labor 
policies behind them, and their exceptions, will be considered in 
turn. 
A. Finality 
Most collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitral 
finality. Conclusiveness is generally expected even in the absence 
of any explicit agreement to that effect? This expectation clearly 
accords with section 203 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 
which provides that "[fJinal adjustment by a method agreed 
upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method 
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application 
or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement."4 
If finality is to have any real meaning, arbitral awards should 
not be subject to judicial review. The strength of the doctrine in 
fact depends on judicial deference to arbitral determinations. 
Courts have generally supported the doctrine. In the seminal 
Steelworkers T r i l ~ g y , ~  for example, the Supreme Court took a 
position hostile to judicial review of arbitration.' In analyzing the 
issues involved in arbitral solutions to industrial disputes, the 
Court noted that "[alrbitration is a stabilizing influence only as 
it serves as a vehicle for handling any and all disputes that arise 
under the agreement."' The Court, therefore, ruled that the 
means chosen by the parties should be given "full play? "Full 
play" could be possible only if courts refrained from "usurping" 
the functions entrusted to the arbitration tribunal by the parties 
themselve~.~ 
Although the principles of finality articulated in the 
2. See Simpson & Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Individual 
Employee, 51 lhx.  L. REV. 1179, 1185-1214 (1973). 
3. See Comment, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing B o b -  
lems of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 936, 948-49 (1976). 
4. 29 U.S.C. 8 173(d) (1970). 
5. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
6. See Naffziger, All Power to the Arbitrator: The Aftermath of the Steelworkers 
Trilogy, Collyer Wire and ENA, 12 AM. Bus. L.J. 295, 296-99 (1975); Smith & Jones, The 
Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MICH. L. 
REV. 751, 751-61 (1965). 
7. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960). 
8. Id. at 566. 
9. Id. at 569. 
134 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
Steelworkers Trilogy are still powerful, there are several excep- 
tional situations in which judicial review is permitted. Section 10 
of the United States Arbitration Actlo catalogues grounds for the 
vacation of an arbitral award. Under the Act, finality is not a bar 
to review when the arbitration process has been infected by fraud, 
corruption, or partiality, or when the arbitrator has exceeded his 
power or has been guilty of misconduct prejudicial to the rights 
of any party? An important judicial exception to the finality 
doctrine was recognized in the relatively recent case of Hines v.  
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., l2 where the Supreme Court ruled that 
if the union breaches its duty of fair representation to the grievant 
so as to undermine "the integrity of the arbitral process," the bar 
of finality is removed.13 The effect of this decision is to permit a 
grievant to sue his employer after an adverse arbitration award 
has been rendered if it can be proved that the union has breached 
its duty of fair representation. 
The duty of fair representation is a concept that must be 
understood to appreciate the justification for this judicial excep- 
tion to finality. But because the same exception is applicable to 
the exhaustion of remedies requirement, it will be helpful to con- 
sider that requirement before investigating the duty of fair repre- 
sentation. 
B. Exhaustion of Remedies 
Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides for the filing 
in federal courts of "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an 
employer and a labor organization."14 While the provision on its 
face allows breach of contract actions to be brought by either the 
union or management, it is not clear whether this language gives 
an individual employee the right to sue his employer for an in- 
jury. One section 301 ambiguity was resolved in Smith v.  Evening 
News Association15 when the Supreme Court ruled that the words 
"between an employer and a labor organization" modified 
"contracts" instead of " ~ u i t s . " ~ ~  But the Court did not deal with 
the critical question of standing: Whether the employee in that 
10. 9 U.S.C. 0 10 (1970). 
11. Id.; see Comment, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing 
Problems of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 936 (1976). 
12. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). 
13. Id. at 567. # 
14. 29 U.S.C. 0 185(a) (1970). 
15. 371 U.S. 195 (1962). 
16. Id. at 200. 
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case could sue under the collective bargaining agreement. 
An answer to the standing question was suggested three years 
later in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox. l7 In Maddox, a grievant 
brought an action in state court against his former employer for 
severence pay that he claimed was due him under the terms of 
the collective bargaining contract. The grievant had made no 
attempt to utilize a three-step grievance procedure before bring- 
ing the court action. The Supreme Court reversed the state court 
decision in favor of the grievant, holding that individuals assert- 
ing grievances under a collective bargaining agreement must at- 
tempt to use the contractual grievance procedures before seeking 
judicial resolutions of their grievances. "[Ulnless the contract 
provides otherwise," said the Court, "there can be no doubt that 
the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his 
behalf."18 Since the grievant had not attempted to use the griev- 
ance procedure, he was denied access to the court. 
In promulgating the requirement that a grievant must at- 
tempt to exhaust contractual remedies before seeking judicial 
assistance, the Maddox Court stood behind the notion of exclu- 
sivity of contractual grievance procedures. "If a grievance proce- 
dure cannot be made exclusive," observed the Court, "it loses 
much of desirability as a method of ~et t lement ."~~ Exclusivity, it  
said, would promote union prestige with its members and would 
serve the employer's interest by limiting the choice of remedies 
available to aggrieved employees. In short, exclusivity would pro- 
mote stability in labor-management relations.'O 
The Maddox Court did allow for exceptions to its "attempt" 
rule. An employee's suit would not be barred, of course, if the 
collective bargaining agreement created a nonexclusive grievance 
pro~edure .~~  The Court also suggested that if an employee found 
it impossible to use contractual grievance procedures, the at- 
tempt requirement would not apply.22 Additionally, the Court 
raised the possibility that other forms of redress might be avail- 
able if the union refused to press, or only perfunctorily pressed, 
the individual's claim.23 
Since Maddox, the attempt rule has more clearly become an 
17. 379 U.S. 650 (1965). 
18. Id. at 653 (footnote omitted). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 657-58. 
22. See id. at 659. 
23. Id. at 652. 
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exhaustion req~irement.~' Generally speaking, the rule has devel- 
oped that an employee who fails to exhaust all grievance steps, 
including arbitration, should not be entitled to sue.25 Exceptions 
to the exhaustion requirement have also undergone development 
since Maddox. One of the most important of these exceptions is 
one that is also applicable to the finality requirement: suit is 
allowed if the union breaches its duty of fair representation. The 
next section will deal with this duty, focusing particularly on how 
its breach constitutes an exception to the exhaustion require- 
ment. 
C. The Duty of Fair Representation 
While increased union strength has generally improved the 
worker's position with respect to management, it has tended to 
weaken his position with respect to the union itself. It has become 
more difficult for the worker to challenge the union from within.26 
The duty of fair representation is a judicial doctrine developed to 
help remedy the inequities occasionally attending the union's 
power as an exclusive bargaining agent.27 Under this doctrine, it 
is not enough that the union merely represent employees in a 
confrontation with management-it must represent them fairly. 
The doctrine of fair representation is said to have been first 
applied in the 1944 case of Steele v .  Louisville & Nashville 
Railroadz8 to prevent a union from amending a collective bargain- 
ing agreement to exclude black employees from railroad work.29 
The Supreme Court found that the Railway Labor Act provision30 
which permitted the election of an exclusive bargaining agent 
also required a corresponding duty to protect the interests of 
every employee within the represented craft.31 
Although Steele was decided under the exclusive representa- 
tion provisions of the Railway Labor Act, its rationale compelled 
24. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967). 
25. See Simpson & Berwick, supra note 2, at 1186. 
26. See Note, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. 
REV. 1119, 1119-21, 1178 (1973). 
27. See Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Frame- 
work and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1096, 
1099 (1974); Note, The Duty of Fair Representation and Exclusive Representation in 
Grievance Administration: The Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1199, 
1199-1201 (1976). This exclusive status is a product of 5 9 of the National Labor Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. 4 159 (1970). 
28. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
29. See Flynn & Higgins, supra note 27, at 1101. 
30. 45 U.S.C. 4 152 (1970). 
31. 323 U.S. at 202. 
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a similar result in Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23,32 which involved 
the exclusivity provisions of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA). Syres dealt with a union attempt to create a racially 
discriminatory seniority system. The Supreme Court's refusal to 
permit such a scheme suggested that the duty of fair representa- 
tion applied to the NLRA.33 
The evolution of the doctrine continued in National Labor 
Relations Board decisionss4 and court opinions,35 but the most 
definitive statement of the duty appeared in the Supreme Court's 
decision of Vaca v. Sipes." Vaca involved a suit by an employee 
against his union for the union's alleged arbitrary refusal to take 
his grievance to arbitration under the procedures of the collective 
bargaining agreement. The employee, Owens, had been dis- 
charged on the ground of poor health. During the fourth step in 
the grievance proced~res ,~~  the union sent him to a physician for 
a complete physical examination. Upon receipt of an unfavorable 
report from the physician, the union decided not to take the 
grievance to a rb i t r a t i~n .~~  Owens sued the union for "arbitrarily, 
capriciously and without just or reasonable reason or cause" re- 
fusing to proceed further.39 
The ultimate question presented in Vaca concerned the rem- 
edies available to an employee when his employer breaches the 
terms of the contract and his union refuses to invoke grievance 
procedures on his behalf. The Court answered the question by 
holding that the employee will be excused from the exhaustion of 
remedies requirement and will be permitted a judicial resolution 
of his grievance upon proving that his union's refusal to invoke 
the grievance procedures was in breach of its duty of fair repre- 
sentation? The Court also articulated a standard for testing al- 
32. 350 U.S. 892, rev'g per curiam 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955). 
33. See Flynn & Higgins, supra note 27, a t  1102. 
34. See, e.g., Independent Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (union 
certification revoked where union practiced segregation and discriminated on the basis of 
race in determining eligibility for full membership); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 
(1962) (union's arbitrary demotion of employee was unfair labor practice), enforcement 
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). 
35. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 350 (1964) (union's broad authority 
as bargaining agent is accompanied by duty of fair representation). 
36. 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
37. The fifth and final step was arbitration. Id. a t  175 n.3. 
38. Id. at 175. Some earlier medical reports had supported Owens' position. Id. a t  
174-75. 
39. Id. a t  173. 
40. Id. at 186. This rule has been criticized as imposing too great a burden on an 
individual grievant. See, e.g., Flynn & Higgins, supra note 27, at 1108-09; Note, The Duty 
of Fair Representation and Exclusive ~ e ~ r e s e n t a t i o n  in Grievance Administration: The 
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leged breaches of the duty: "A breach of the statutory duty of fair 
representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a 
member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discrimina- 
tory, or in bad faith."41 
To some extent, the Court's unwillingness to grant the indi- 
vidual employee "an absolute right to have his grievance taken 
to a r b i t r a t i ~ n " ~ ~  reflects a theory of industrial relations developed 
by Professor Archibald Cox that places a premium on union con- 
trol over grievance  prosecution^.^^ In a discussion citing Professor 
Cox, the Court observed that a grievance settlement procedure 
giving the union discretion in invoking remedies eliminates fiivo- 
lous grievances, promotes consistent treatment, and assists the 
resolution of contractual ambiguities. Moreover, "the settlement 
process furthers the interest of the union as statutory agent and 
as coauthor of the barbaining agreement in representing the em- 
ployees in the enforcement of that agreement."44 On the other 
hand, if the employee could compel arbitration over union objec- 
tions, more grievances would go to costly arbitration and the 
employees' reliance on the union could be ~ n d e r m i n e d . ~ ~  
Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1199, 1200 (1976). 
41. 386 U.S. at 190. 
42. Id. a t  191. 
43. Professor Cox gives several "strong reasons for concluding that the bargaining 
representative ought to have power under a broad industrial agreement to control the 
prosecution of claims for breach of contract." Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 601, 625 (1956). Paraphrased, his arguments are: 
(1) The union may be the only party qualified to prosecute the claim. 
(2) The group of employees may be affected by future implications of a griev- 
ance ruling to an extent that outweighs the individual claim for relief. 
(3) Many claims of contract violation affect employees other than those di- 
rectly damaged. 
(4) Vesting grievance control in the union increases the likelihood of uniform- 
ity while it reduces the chances for discrimination and competition. 
(5) Competition between employee groups can promote plant unrest and deter 
the union from taking a responsible position. 
(6) The union can resolve conflicting interests among employees. 
See id. He also lists several disadvantages to giving individual grievants sole right to 
prosecute claims: 
(1) It  disregards established practice. 
(2) I t  exposes the grievant to a situation of unequal bargaining power. 
(3) I t  disregards group interests. 
(4) It compels tenuous line drawing between suits for individual damage and 
claims only the group can present. 
(5) It is contrary to the implications of NLRA 5 8(a)(5). 
See id. 
44. 386 U.S. at  191. 
45. Of course, the approach taken by the Court does not give the union absolute 
control over grievance proceedings. Indeed, the Court's effort in Vaca can be seen as one 
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Thus, it is clear from Vaca that an employee may escape the 
strict confines of grievance procedures and the exhaustion of rem- 
edies requirement if he can show that his union breached its duty 
of fair representation. Unanswered by Vaca is whether a grievant 
can compel a judicial resolution of his claim against management 
when the union continues to prosecute his grievance through arbi- 
tration, but prosecutes it in a manner that breaches the duty of 
fair representation. In short, can the grievant enjoin the arbitra- 
tion proceeding by alleging a breach of the duty? This question 
has been discussed by several courts, but the judicial results have 
not been consistent. In order to suggest a possible consistent re- 
sult, it will be useful to consider how courts have dealt with the 
issue. 
DI. Exmusno~ OF REMEDIES AND THE ARBITRATION STAGE: 
THE CASE LAW 
The earliest judicial decision articulating a clear stand on the 
issue was Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2.46 The case involved 
a complaint by the administrators of Louis Hiller's estate that the 
decedent had been unlawfully discharged from employment with 
the "knowledge, consent and connivance" of his union. The de- 
fendants moved in the district court for a stay pending arbitra- 
tion, and the motion was granted. The issue was thus presented 
whether allegations amounting to a breach of the duty of fair 
representation4' were sufficient to overcome the contractual pro- 
vision requiring the arbitration of such disputes. The appellate 
court held that the allegations were sufficient, reasoning that 
where the employee's case is based upon a conspiracy between 
his union and his employer to deprive him of his rights he cannot 
be forced to submit that issue to an arbitration between the 
employer and the union. Such a procedure would fail completely 
to settle the issues between the union member and his union. It 
would entrust representation of the employee to the very union 
which he claims refused him fair representation, and it would 
present as adversaries in the arbitration procedure the two par- 
ties who, the employee claims, are joined in a conspiracy to 
defraud him.48 
- --  
of attempting to balance competing interests of employer, union, and employee-with the 
duty of fair representation serving as the medium of balance. See Comment, Protection 
of Individual Rights in Collective Bargaining: The Need for a More Definitive Standard 
of Fair Representation Within the Vaca Doctrine, 14 VILL. L. REV. 484, 494 (1969). 
46. 338 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1964). 
47. Id. at 779. 
48. Id. 
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If such a conspiracy prevents a fair representation of the 
employee's interests in arbitration, one possible solution would be 
to permit the employee himself to appear or be represented in the 
proceeding. Apparently, the lower court had approved of just 
such an arrangement in its order. The circuit court found the 
proposed solution to be inadequate: 
[Tlhis arrangement fails to cure the defects, since the plaintiffs 
would still be aligned on the side of their adversary the union 
or, if not, the order would have to be construed as forcing the 
plaintiffs to arbitrate issues with employer and union which 
neither they nor their decedent ever agreed to arbitrate.49 
Having reached these conclusions about the effect of a breach of 
the duty of fair representation on arbitral fairness and the inade- 
quacy of the lower court's solution to the problem, the Second 
Circuit reversed the order granting a stay of judicial action. 
A similar approach on different facts was again used by the 
Second Circuit in Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid CO.~O In that 
case, Desrosiers sued his former employer and union. He alleged 
that the employer's failure to transfer him to another job for 
medical reasons constituted a violation of the collective bargain- 
ing agreement. He charged the union with a breach of the duty 
of fair representation for its failure to assist him in seeking the 
transfer. Jurisdiction was sought, in part, under section 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act. An earlier action by Desrosiers 
had been dismissed because he had failed to use the grievance 
machinery. On this second attempt, the plaintiff alleged that a 
conspiracy between the union and his employer had deprived him 
of his rights. The lower court ruled against Desrosiers on a motion 
for summary judgment. The issue ultimately presented on appeal 
concerned the circumstances under which an individual em- 
ployee "is required to exhaust grievance procedures provided by 
a collective bargaining agreement between his employer and his 
union before he may maintain suit in the courts to enforce rights 
under that agreement. "51 
The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of Desrosiers' ac- 
tion. Noting that the "somewhat inartistically drawn" allegations 
of the complaint were sufficient to charge a breach of the union's 
duty of fair representation under Vaca and were similar to the 
charge made in Hiller, the court indicated that pursuit of a rem- 
49. Id. a t  779-80 (emphasis in original). 
50. 377 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1967). 
51. Id. at 867. 
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edy under the contractual grievance machinery might have been 
futile." This fact was enough for the action to survive a motion 
to dismiss-there were "genuine issues of material fact to be 
tried."53 
In Lusk u. Eastern PToducts C ~ r p . , ~ *  the Fourth Circuit reaf- 
firmed the rule articulated in Hiller and Desrosiers even though 
the case was decided against the grievants. The plaintiffs in Lusk 
were opposed to a freezing of working shifts agreed to by the union 
and management. A grievance was presented to the company by 
the union on behalf of the dissatisfied employees, but nine days 
later the grievants filed a section 301 action. The district court 
stayed its own proceedings pending final arbitration. During the 
stay, the grievance was processed without resolution. Ultimately, 
arbitration was scheduled. The grievants were invited to attend 
the arbitration hearings, to participate in them, and to be repre- 
sented by counsel.55 The arbitrator's decision was that the griev- 
ance was without merit. Following this decision, the district 
court granted motions by union and management to dismiss the 
plaintiffs' complaint. On appeal, the plaintiffs complained, inter 
alia, that it was error to require them to submit to arbitration. 
The Fourth Circuit first noted that it  was "established that 
federal courts have jurisdiction under 8 301 of the Labor Manage- 
ment Relations Act where a member of a union charges that his 
union breached its duty to fairly represent him by colluding with 
the company to deprive him of his rights."56 But, said the court, 
when allegations of a breach of the duty of fair representation are 
merely "conclusory," they fail to state a valid claim.57 The court 
determined that this was the case here, since no specific factual 
allegations supported the charges. However, the district court 
had dismissed the complaint, not for its conclusory nature, 
but on the theory that plaintiffs were required to submit the 
subject of their complaint to arbitration, that all questions 
raised in plaintiffs' complaint had been resolved adversely to 
plaintiffs by the arbitrator and that the arbitrator's holdings 
were binding upon the court and upon  plaintiff^.^^ 
- 
52. Id. at 870-71. 
53. Id. at 871. 
54. 427 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1970). 
55. Id. at 707. Counsel for the grievants did attend and participate, but announced 
that he would not "actually enter into the grievance process." Id. 
56. Id. at 708. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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This holding, said the court, was incorrect. 
The proper rule was declared by the court to be that articu- 
lated in the Hiller case? But despite its adherence to the Hiller- 
Desrosiers rule, the court affirmed the lower decision, refusing to 
upset a correct result that was incorrectly reasoned.60 The court 
did not discuss the advisability of including the grievants in the 
arbitration proceeding, but inasmuch as they were represented in 
the proceeding that occurred, the implication is that the court 
perceived that remedy as inadequate. 
I t  should be noted that federal courts have not been alone in 
accepting the Hiller-Desrosiers rule. The Supreme Court of Ore- 
gon, for example, has clearly aligned itself with the approach of 
the cases discussed in this section. In Wagner v. Columbia Hospi- 
tal Distri~t ,~ '  that court was faced with a wrongful discharge ac- 
tion by a former employee who alleged that the discharge 
stemmed from a conspiracy between union and management to 
violate her civil rights. Both union and management had filed 
motions to abate the action and to require arbitration under the 
terms of the collective agreement. The motions had been granted, 
and the plaintiff appealed. 
The court observed that in the "normal" situation, national 
labor policies would be served by not allowing arbitration to be 
frustrated by the bringing of court actions. But his approach, 
noted the court, is "based upon the assumption that the interests 
of the employee will be fairly represented by the union."62 When 
a conspiracy between union and management is alleged, however, 
that assumption fails. The court rejected the contention that the 
grievant must "utilize the grievance procedure to the point where 
she can claim the union did not give her fair representation as a 
condition precedent to her filing the l a ~ s u i t . " ~  Instead, the court 
articulated the following rule: 
[I]f the complaint of a discharged employee alleges facts from 
which it appears that the interests of the employee will not be 
fairly represented by the union in an arbitration proceeding, 
with the result that such a remedy would be useless and futile, 
a motion to abate such proceedings . . . to require the employee 
to submit his claim to arbitration . . . will be denied. In such a 
case the trial court must then proceed to determine, by trial if 
-- 
59. Id.; see text accompanying note 48 supra. 
60. 427 F.2d at 708. 
61. 259 Or. 15, 485 P.2d 421 (1971). 
62. Id. at 24, 485 P.2d at 425. 
63. Id. at 27, 485 P.2d at 427. 
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necessary, whether plaintiff can prove the allegations of his 
complaint .64 
Under the facts of the case, the court determined that requiring 
arbitration to proceed would be futile and that the plaintiff could 
not expect fair representation of her interests by the union.65 
Several courts, however, have not followed the Hiller- 
Desrosiers rule. The most significant departure from that rule 
occurred in the recent case of Hotel & Restaurant Employees & 
Bartenders International Union u. Michelson's Food Services, 
Inc? The Michelson's case featured a complaint by a grievant 
that the employer, Michelson's, had failed to pay over $30,000 
due him under a labor agreement. The grievant, Manning, initi- 
ated a grievance action by filing a written complaint with the 
union. When the union was unable to reach agreement with 
Michelson's in the first two stages of the dispute resolution proce- 
d ~ r e , ~ '  it demanded binding arbitration of the grievance. On the 
day of the arbitration hearing, Manning appeared with his attor- 
ney and accused the union of conspiring with Michelson's to deny 
him the compensation and insisted that the union could not fairly 
represent him. Manning's attorney requested that the union be 
joined as a defendant, that the arbitrator be empowered to grant 
compensatory and punitive damages against both defendants, 
and that Manning be allowed to represent the entire class of 
similarly situated employees. The union agreed to allow Manning 
and his counsel to direct the case, but Michelson's said i t  would 
not submit to arbitration unless Manning agreed to be bound by 
the decision, something that Manning refused to do. 
When the parties were unable to reach agreement, the arbi- 
trator took it upon himself to issue an interim award providing 
that (1) Manning would be designated as a party to the action 
and would be bound by the decision, (2) any other employees 
could be joined in the proceeding, and (3) punitive damages, 
costs, and attorneys' fees might be awarded against either the 
union or Michelson's. The union was directed to petition a court 
for enforcement of this award, and enforcement was sought in a 
California state court. Removing the case to federal district court, 
64. Id. at 27-28, 485 P.2d at 427. 
65. Other cases taking essentially the same approach include Glover v. S t .  Louis-San 
Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969); Smi th  v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870 
(3d Cir. 1972); Sheridan v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2, 444 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1971). 
66. 545 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1976). 
67. The collective bargaining agreement created a three-step dispute resolution pro- 
cedure, with the final step being binding arbitration. Id. at 1250. 
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Michelson's opposed the petition. Finding that the arbitrator's 
award exceeded the scope of his authority, the district court de- 
nied enforcement. 
Ruling on an appeal brought by the union, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, holding that arbitration between the union and Michel- 
son's should go forward with Manning as a party, but that the 
arbitration should be limited to Manning's grievance against 
Michelson's without provision for punitive damages. The court 
found nothing in the collective bargaining agreement that would 
allow arbitration of Manning's claim against the union. In re- 
sponse to the argument that the arbitration should not go forward 
when the grievant complains of union breach of the duty of fair 
representation, the court said that the federal policies involved in 
the arbitration of grievances should prevent the abortion of the 
proceeding, particularly when charges of the breach were first 
asserted a t  the arbitration stage of the dispute resolution proce- 
dure. In reaching its decision the court was forced to cope with 
the weight of contrary authority. Acknowledging the implications 
of Hiller, Desrosiers, Lusk, and Wagner, the court strained, rather 
unconvincingly, to distinguish the four cases. Ultimately, the 
court admitted that it was "quite impossible" to reconcile every- 
thing courts had said about the issue." It further confessed that 
its determination that arbitration should proceed when the 
grievant complains of a conspiracy between labor and manage- 
ment was not a happy solution. Nevertheless, the court said it 
was a solution that comportd with the spirit of judicial decisions 
defining national labor policies." 
Another departure from the Hiller-Desrosiers rule may be 
found in the opinion of the Pennsylvania district court in 
Aldridge v. Ludwig-Honold Manufacturing CO.'O In A ldridge, an 
employee brought suit against his employer for breach of the 
collective agreement with respect to his being laid off and later 
rehired a t  an inferior grade. He also sued the union for a breach 
of the duty of fair representation. The defendants moved for sum- 
mary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to ex- 
haust the grievance machinery. The court entered judgment for 
the defendants, ruling that any lower level union decision not to 
68. Id. at 1254. 
69. In this connection, the court referred to Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); 
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); and the Steelworkers Trilogy, 363 U.S. 564,574, 
593 (1960). These cases articulate the view that grievance disputes are basically to be 
resolved by the collective parties outgide of the courtroom. 
70. 385 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 1397 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 937 (1975). 
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prosecute a grievance must be appealed to a higher level within 
the union's grievance procedure before a judicial action could be 
brought. The grievant had not done so, but instead had alleged 
that there was a conspiracy between union and management. The 
court rejected the excuse, declaring that the policy of forestalling 
judicial interference with internal union affairs should not be 
circumvented when an employee alleges the existence of a con- 
spiracy between union and management." 
IV. WEIGHING THE ALTERNATIVES 
The foregoing review of judicial authority makes it apparent 
that several courts would permit a grievant to secure a stay of 
arbitration proceedings if he alleges the existence of a conspiracy 
between his union and management to deprive him of his rights. 
The obvious alternative approach to the problem is simply to 
permit arbitration to generate a result that can be judicially re- 
viewed if the grievant establishes a valid ground for upsetting the 
award. This latter approach is basically what the Michelson's 
court chose-with the significant twist of sanctioning a tripartite 
arbitration proceeding to ensure representation of the grievant's 
interests. Each of these approaches will now be evaluated in an 
effort to define which solution, if any, is most satisfactory. 
A. Stay of Arbitraton 
A basic justification for staying arbitration when the grievant 
alleges that the arbitral parties are conspiring against him is that, 
if the allegation is true, the resulting award will be essentially 
meaningless. In such a circumstance, the "adversaries" will really 
be allies, and the arbitrator will only be presented with those 
facts and those agruments that will point to a result desired by 
the conspirators. The result will not be reflective of the grievant's 
interests or of reality. Therefore, the argument goes, the arbitra- 
tion should be stayed, pending proof of the grievant's allegation 
of conspiracy. 
The major national labor policy that would be served by this 
solution to the problem is that the collective bargaining agree- 
ment should be enfor~ed.'~ A stay of arbitration, in this context, 
71. Id. at 699. It is not clear from the opinion whether the court was influenced by 
what may have been the "conclusory" nature of the conspiracy allegation. As evidenced 
by the discussion in Lusk, a conclusory allegation will not pass muster in some courts. 
See note 57 and accompanying text supra. But see Fiore v. Associated Transp., Inc., 255 
F. Supp. 596 (M.D. Pa. 1966). 
72. This has been termed the most important national labor policy underlying § 301 
146 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1978: 
provides some assurance that the individual rights specified in 
the collective agreement will not be violated by a union- 
management conspiracy. Recourse to the courtroom will also per- 
mit the grievant to bring an unfair representation action against 
the union.73 Continued arbitration, on the other hand, would not 
permit the grievant to satisfy his allegations against the union, 
at least not until after arbitrati~n. '~ 
There are other reasons to favor a stay of arbitration as well. 
Certainly when an actual conspiracy exists, a termination of arbi- 
tration will prevent misuse of the arbitral process and loss of time 
and money in a futile proceeding. The difficulty with this argu- 
ment, of course, is that these economic benefits are not realized 
unless a conspiracy is in fact established. If the grievant cannot 
demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy or breach of the duty 
of fair representation, the court cannot hear the section 301 action 
and the case must be resubmitted to arbitration. Inasmuch as it 
is no simple matter to prove a breach of the the economic 
argument for a stay of arbitration is not overwhelming. 
Perhaps the most persuasive reason for permitting termina- 
tion of arbitration when the grievant alleges the existence of a 
conspiracy is that his individual contractual rights will be most 
effectively supported by a stay. This focus on individual rights, 
however, seems to run counter to such basic collectivist notions 
as maintaining industrial peace, preserving union prestige in the 
bargaining unit, and promoting industrial self-government 
-notions underlying current national labor policy. By taking the 
grievance prosecution out of the established grievance machinery, 
it may be argued, all of these collective interests are impaired. 
These collective concerns, however, may be more relevant to the 
negotiating side of industrial relations than they are to the griev- 
ance side. In this sense, contractual disputes can be distinguished 
from grievance d i s p ~ t e s . ~ ~  In the former the interests of all union 
members and management are a t  stake, whereas in the latter the 
- -- -- pp - 
of the Taft-Hartley Act. See Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor 
Agreement and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U .  TOL. L. REV. 514,533 (1974). 
73. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U S .  171 (1967). 
74. See Hiller v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2, 338 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1964). 
75. See Note, The Duty of Fair Representation and Its Applicability When a Union 
Refuses to Process an Individual's Grievance, 20 S.C.L. REV. 253, 267-69 (1968); Com- 
ment, Post-Vaca Standards of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation: Consolidating 
Bargaining Units, 19 VILL. L. REV. 885, 901 (1974). 
76. See Note, Finality and Fair Representation: Grievance Arbitration Is Not Final 
If the Union Has Breached Its Duty of Fair Representation, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309, 
325 (1977); Note, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77 
YALE L.J. 559, 562 (1968). 
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interests of the individual are more pron~unced. '~ Industrial sta- 
bility, for example, is not much affected by contrary positions in 
a grievance dispute, but i t  is greatly affected by an impasse in 
contract negotiations. Therefore, while i t  might be entirely proper 
to stress collective concerns when a contract is at  stake, it is 
arguably appropriate to emphasize individual interests when a 
grievance is being proces~ed.'~ 
B. Continuation of Arbitration 
There are several "practical" reasons for allowing arbitration 
proceedings to continue in the face of allegations of union- 
management conspiracy. Uninterrupted arbitration is also sup- 
ported by the policy notions of industrial self-government and 
arbitral absolutism announced in the Steelworkers line of cases? 
This section will consider practicalities and policies supporting 
the continuation of arbitration. 
One practical reason not to stay arbitral proceedings is that 
an award may issue that will satisfy the grievant. The grievant 
may simply be mistaken about the existence of a conspiracy be- 
tween his union and his employer. Because the union has to work 
closely with management on a variety of matters, it may decline 
to assume a belligerent bargaining posture on the grievant's 
claim. Of course, the lack of belligerence does not necessarily 
indicate the existence of a conspiracy, but it may disappoint the 
grievant to the extent that he imagines one exists. Even if there 
is a conspiracy, it is conceivable that the arbitration award will 
satisfy the grievant. The arbitrator is rather free to structure his 
awards,80 and his resolution may not reflect the wishes of either 
conspirator. 
Another reason supporting continuation of arbitration is that 
it may make little economic sense to terminate an ongoing pro- 
ceeding. Arbitration represents the last step in the process of 
resolving a grievance-it occurs when other efforts have failed. To 
suspend the dispute resolution process just before a decision is 
reached is wasteful, especially since the allegations of conspiracy 
77. Though insofar as a particular dispute resolution establishes a precedent or a 
grievance arises out of a common occurrence, the interests of many others may be in- 
volved. See Cox, supra note 43, at 615. 
78. The failure to recognize this distinction may lead to harsh results. See Note, 
Finality and Fair Representation: Grievance Arbitration Is Not Final If the Union Has 
Breached Its Duty of Fair Representation, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309, 325 (1977). 
79. See notes 5-9 and accompanying text supra. 
80. See generally Naffziger, note 6 supra. 
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may be untrue or unprovable. Rather than terminate nonjudicial 
efforts to resolve the dispute a t  this late stage, why not let them 
continue? After an arbitration award issues, a dissatisfied griev- 
ant could seek to upset it by alleging conspiracy and breach of 
the duty of fair representation. If these allegations prevail, he 
may have a judicial resolution of his claim. If they fail, there will 
already have been a determination of the issue. 
Policy justifications for permitting arbitration to continue 
may be more important than practical ones. Recalling that the 
policy of preserving industrial stability depends in part on the 
union's prestige and support in the bargaining unit, it may be 
contended that a suspension of arbitration could adversely affect 
these interests by challenging the union's competence to repre- 
sent members of the bargaining unit. Such a suspension could 
undermine the level of union support by communicating either 
that the bargaining agent is not to be trusted or that the grievance 
machinery is ineffectual. In extreme cases, diminished support 
for one bargaining agent might encourage employee unrest or 
recognitional rivalry among several unions. I t  could also deter 
management from cooperating with the union. This would under- 
mine industrial stability. 
Admittedly, the risk of industrial instability may not be par- 
ticularly great in this context. Indeed, it might be observed that 
the risk actually extends both ways. If a grievant were unable to 
receive prompt and fair resolution of his claim due to a union- 
management conspiracy (or what he believed was one), his dissat- 
isfaction could be infectious. 
A stronger policy reason against permitting a stay of arbitra- 
tion to issue upon an allegation of conspiracy is that intervening 
judicial supervision would tend to substitute a government deci- 
sion for industrial self-determination-at least to the extent that 
the arbitration proceeding represents a choice of the collective 
parties. This policy in favor of industrial self-determination is the 
one so strongly emphasized in the arbitration context in 
Steelworkers. To upset the mechanism of industrial decisionmak- 
ing in its latter stages seems to denigrate the Steelworkers ap- 
proach. 
This argument is persuasive when there is in fact no conspir- 
acy. If the allegations of conspiracy are true, however, the conten- 
tion loses much of its force: Why shoud the courts defer to in- 
dustrial self-government when that government is despotic? Of 
course, since there is no way to test the validity of the allegation 
without intervening in the arbitral process, it would seem best to 
defer to the arbitration procedure until an award is issued. 
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Mention should also be made here of the argument that indi- 
vidual interests, because they are more pronounced in grievance 
disputes, should permit arbitration to be stayed pending a judi- 
cial resolution of the conspiracy claim. This argument more 
closely approaches rhetoric than reality. There may be little need 
to worry about the inequity of supporting collective interests at 
the expense of individual ones, since continued arbitration may 
not be actually incompatible with individual interests. Indeed, it 
may be averred that continued arbitration both preserves the 
purity of the grievance machinery while it permits the individual 
to have eventual redress in the face of a conspiracy. This is possi- 
ble because the arbitration award will be upset if the individual 
grievant can show grounds for vacation under section 10 of the 
Arbitration Act8* or can demonstrate that the union has breached 
its duty of fair representati~n.~~ In view of the possibility of an 
arbitral upset, it can be maintained that the grievant alleging a 
conspiracy loses nothing more than a little time if the arbitration 
continues to an end. When the award is made, the grievant can 
then approach the court to have it vacated on appropriate 
grounds. If his conspiracy allegation has merit, it will permit him 
to have his day in 
C. Tripartite Arbitration 
One significant variation on the theme of continuing the ar- 
bitration despite an allegation of conspiracy is to include the 
grievant or his attorney in the arbitral proceeding. The 
Michelson's court spoke of this procedure as a means of protect- 
ing the interests of the grievant.84 Whether or not such a proce- 
dure does protect the interests of the grievant is subject to some 
question. A further question may be raised about the propriety 
of introducing a third party into a contractually established arbi- 
tral proceeding. 
Certainly the presence of the grievant or his attorney in the 
- - 
81. See 9 U.S.C. fi 10 (1970). 
82. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Comment, Judicial 
Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 936, 956 n.117 (1976). 
83. The force of this contention presumes a judicial willingness to upset an otherwise 
final arbitration award when the requisite grounds are established. While it has been 
observed that courts are resistant to upsetting awards for breach of the duty of fair 
representation, see Tobias, supra note 72, at 537, in the the aftermath of Hines v. Anchor 
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976), it is likely that courts will be receptive to fair 
representation challenges to finality. 
84. 545 F.2d at 1252. 
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arbitration hearings would seem to ensure that his side of the 
matter would be aired. It is conceivable, however, that this ad- 
vantage would be outweighed by the disadvantages of the ar- 
rangement. For example, it is likely that in the context of a con- 
spiracy charge the union would not be vigorous in asserting the 
grievant's position. Indeed, if the charges of conspiracy were true, 
the arbitral situation would resemble an action by a plaintiff 
against codefendants. Such an arbitration lineup may present 
difficulties for an arbitrator who is chosen by the collective par- 
ties, who is accustomed to dealing with the concerns of collective 
parties, and who may be adept at reaching compromises reflect- 
ing collective interests. I t  may be difficult for the arbitrator to be 
objective when the collective parties seem to be more or less on 
the same side of the issue. 
I t  should be observed, of course, that such tripartite arbitra- 
tion would not focus explicitly on the question of the union's 
breach of the duty of fair representation. Such a claim is not 
arbitrable under the contract between labor and management. 
But i t  is nevertheless probable that the conspiracy charges which 
justified the tripartite arrangement in the first place would at  
least muddy the arbitral waters and perhaps contribute to a 
plaintiff-codefendant scenario. I t  is conceivable, therefore, that 
the presence of the grievant or his attorney in the arbitration 
hearings will not result in a better outcome for the grievant. In- 
deed, it is possible that the ultimate outcome could be worse. 
Although a grievant can attempt to upset an unfavorable 
arbitration award on the ground that the union breached its duty 
of fair representation, if the same claim is made following an 
arbitral proceeding in which the grievant represented his own 
interests, it may be difficult for a court to believe that a union's 
breach could have had any effect on the arbitrator's award. That 
is, the court may reason that since the grievant himself was al- 
lowed to represent his position, the arbitration award could not 
have been made without a fair consideration of the grievant's 
claim. Once a grievant enters into a tripartite arbitration pro- 
ceeding, therefore, he may undercut the ultimate strength of his 
judicial position. 
Perhaps developments like the ones just referred to are un- 
likely to materialize. I t  may well be that the benefits of including 
a grievant in arbitration hearings outweigh the potential risks. 
The risks are not so remote, however, that they should be over- 
looked. 
A further question may be raised about the appropriateness 
of the tripartite arrangement. Is i t  proper to include what 
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amounts to a third party in the arbitration after it has begun? 
The question is a serious one because if, as has been judicially 
affirmed, the legitimacy of arbitration stems from the parties' 
contractual agreement,85 it is arguable that the arbitrator's inclu- 
sion of a third party in the proceeding goes beyond the scope of 
the parties' agreement and therefore beyond the arbitrator's 
power. 
Tripartite arbitration has been judicially approved in only a 
few circumstances. In Transportation- Communication Employ- 
ees Union v. Union Pacific Railroads7 and Columbia Broad casting 
S y s t e m ,  Inc .  v .  A m e r i c a n  Recording & Broadcast ing 
Association, tripartite arrangements were allowed that involved 
two unions and one employer where jurisdictional disputes had 
arisen between the unions. In these cases the contentions of the 
parties lent themselves well to tripartite arbitration. 
Aside from Michelson's, no other case seems to have ap- 
proved a tripartite arrangement in a nonjurisdictional context? 
An earlier decision by the Ninth Circuit? however, did contain 
language to the effect that the question whether a grievance may 
be processed by a bargaining agent or by the grievant himself is 
a procedural matter and that procedural matters are left to the 
arbitrator's discretion. This case, Association of Industrial Scien- 
tists u. Shell Development Co.," can be distinguished from the 
situation under consideration here because its focus was not on a 
tripartite procedure but rather on one in which either the grievant 
or his agent would take the field against management. Neverthe- 
less, the "procedural" theory espoused in that case is applicable 
to the tripartite situation and was applied in M i c h e l s ~ n ' s . ~ ~  
In addition to the procedural argument for including an indi- 
vidual grievant in arbitration proceedings, it may be useful to 
85. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
86. For a discussion emphasizing the advantages of including the grievant in arbitra- 
tion proceedings, see Rosen, The Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still An- 
other Look at the Problem, 24 MD. L. REV. 233 (1964). 
87. 385 U.S. 157 (1966). 
88. 414 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1969). 
89. It should be noted that some commentators have seen in the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), a judicial sanction for tripartite 
arbitration. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 86, a t  292-93. The Ninth Circuit Court in 
Michelson's apparently agreed with these commentators, since it cited Humphrey for the 
proposition that the grievant could participate in the arbitration to protect his interests. 
545 F.2d a t  1252. 
90. 348 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1965). 
91. 545 F.2d a t  1252. The ~ichelson 's  court relied on John Wiley & Sons v. Living- 
ston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964), for the proposition that procedural questions could be 
decided by the arbitrator. 
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recall that the union is an agent for the grievant in his 
While admittedly the union may have more than the individual 
grievant's interests to pursue in a given arbitral p ro~eed ing ,~~  it 
would not seem too outrageous from a legal standpoint to permit 
the "principal" to participate with his agent in the dispute reso- 
lution process. 
In view of the judicial tendency to approve a tripartite arbi- 
tral arrangement in cases dealing with jurisdictional disputes be- 
tween unions, and considering the  "procedural" approach to the 
problem that has achieved judicial sanction, it seems to be legally 
appropriate for a court to countenance a tripartite procedure. But 
even though legally appropriate, such an arrangement is subject 
to the risk that an adverse arbitral award may be more difficult 
to upset when the grievant participates in the proceeding. 
The court in Michelson's was careful to limit its holding to 
the facts before it?* The court did not want to suggest that the 
approach it took should be a standard one. Perhaps a standard 
solution is impossible. Certainly as long as arbitrators are able to 
make significant "procedural" adjustments in their proceedings, 
i t  will not be a simple matter for courts to impose uniformity. And 
uniformity may not be advisable in any event-perhaps different 
solutions should be devised to deal with different situations. 
A uniform approach, however, would have advantages. Cer- 
tainty would be promoted by a standard solution, and certainty 
would contribute to industrial peace. A standard solution could 
also ensure that the interests of the individual grievant and the 
collective parties would be protected to some extent from discre- 
tionary treatment. Furthermore, the difficulty of fashioning 
unique remedies for unique fact situations could be alleviated if 
a remedy were devised that would apply well to all. 
With these considerations in mind, and recalling the argu- 
ments for and against alternative solutions, uninterrupted arbi- 
tration should be the standard approach to the problem of con- 
spiracy allegations arising at  the arbitration stage of grievance 
92. The Ninth Circuit pointed out in Michelson's that the union was the grievant's 
agent in making, performing, and enforcing the collective agreement. 545 F.2d at 1252. 
93. See Note, The Duty of Fair Representation and Exclusive Representation in 
Grievance Arbitration: The Duty of Fair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1199, 1211 
(1976). 
94. 545 F.2d at 1255. The qualification was: "We say nothing as to what our decision 
might be in a different case." Id. 
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proceedings. On balance, there seems to be little to lose and much 
to gain by having arbitration continue in the face of a conspiracy 
charge. The simple reason why is this: The justification for escap- 
ing exhaustion is also a justification for upsetting a "final" arbi- 
tral award, namely, that the union has breached its duty of fair 
representation. In other words, in order to achieve a judicial hear- 
ing of his claim, the grievant's hurdle is the same whether he 
wishes to abate the arbitral proceeding or upset an unsatisfactory 
award. Once a breach of the duty of fair representation is demon- 
strated, the court will hear the grievance. At this point, it  makes 
no difference whether an arbital award has been made or 
not-the court will decide the issue. But if a breach of the duty 
is not demonstrated after termination of arbitation, it makes a 
great difference, for there is no arbitral award existing to settle 
the dispute. Following the courtroom confrontation, there will 
have to be an arbitral resolution. And what would prevent the 
grievant from alleging a breach of the duty in a subsequent 
arbitration? 
It should be recalled that a central theme of national labor 
policy is to encourage the nonjudicial resolution of disputes. That 
policy theme would suffer were a grievant able to take his case 
to court before the nonjudicial machinery could generate a result. 
The proposed solution permits the grievance machinery to func- 
tion through to a conclusion. It also permits the grievant who is 
dissatisfied with the result to have a courtroom hearing if he can 
demonstrate that the union has breached its duty of fair represen- 
tation. 
The proposed solution will, of course, be an inconvenience to 
the grievant who can establish a breach of the union's duty-it 
will mean a minor delay of his judicial hearing. But it will not 
prevent his ultimate vindication. For the grievant who cannot 
demonstrate a breach of the duty, the delay may also be unattrac- 
tive. But in that case, a final result will have been generated by 
the arbitration that will be determinative of the parties' rights. 
This result will be both efficient and supportive of national labor 
policy. 
Tripartite arbitration should not be encouraged. The objec- 
tive is not that it would be legally inappropriate to add a new 
party to the proceeding, but that it might work to the disadvan- 
tage of the grievant when an actual conspiracy does exist. It 
would probably be more difficult to upset an arbitral award on 
unfair representation grounds when the grievant has represented 
himself. 
The proffered solution is an orthodox one from the stand- 
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point of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. I t  provides that,  
once the arbitration stage of the grievance machinery is reached, 
the machinery should be allowed to function until a result is 
produced. It is conceivable, of course, that this result will not be 
a correct one. When the result is erroneous because there has been 
a conspiracy between the union and management, the correct 
result can only be reached if courts are willing to recognize the 
unfair representation exception to the finality rule and review the 
arbitral award. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Hines u.Anchor Motor Freight, I ~ C . , ~ ~  it is more likely than ever 
that the exception will be applied. Its application in this context 
will ensure that individual rights are safeguarded even as collec- 
tive interests are upheld. 
N. Gregory Smi th  
95. 424 U.S. 554 (1976). See text accompaning notes 12-13 supra. 
